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In the post-World War II period the European coun­
tries have experienced rapid economic growth under 
a variety of socioeconomic systems. That growth was 
associated with an enormous expansion of trade and 
foreign investment, and with considerable spatial re­
distribution of the population. For instance, in 1974 
Greek migrant workers were more than 10% of the 
Greek labor force, and foreign workers made up 
more than one-fourth of the Swiss labor force and 
more than ten per cent of both the West German and 
French labor force. By 1970, in Western Europe 
alone the total number of migrant workers exceeded 
six million (Böhning). As it is well known, the ben­
efits from that phenomenal growth experience ac­
crued unevenly over nations and regions. The immi­
gration of labor from developing to developed Euro­
pean countries has received a considerable amount of 
attention by social scientists. Yet, the recent Euro­
pean experience has been somewhat neglected by 
economists and its long-run impact on the labor­
exporting countries has been left largely unexplored. 
Most mainstream writing and research on interna­
tional migration attempts to explain it as «factor 
movements in response to earnings differentials». 
A widely quoted application of this thesis in the 
European South-to-North migration, Kindleberger’s 
Europe’s Postwar Growth, concludes that migration 
has benefited both labor-exporting and labor-reci­
pient countries. It is argued that a high elasticity 
of migrant labor supply in the sending countries and a 
low elasticity in the receiving countries allow immi­
gration in the labor-receiving countries to keep wages 
low (which, then, make high profits and sustained 
accumulation possible). It is argued further that labor 
earnings in the sending countries are not affected and 
as immigrant remittances help transform «surplus» 
labor into savings both parts stand to gain.
This view is considered too simplistic and essen­
tially inadequate. And although the literature con­
tains a variety of refined models it is argued here that 
the long-run impact of migration on the labor­
exporting countries is not well understood for 
reasons some of which may be stated as follows: 
First, rigorous structural analyses of European migra­
tion have not been performed; second, the impact of 
migration in exacerbating structural imbalances is not 
well explored; third, for most of the countries in­
volved, its impact on the balance of payments is not 
clear; fourth, the overall balance sheet of who gained 
and who lost from this process has not been drawn; 
and, fifth, how migration fits into the relation be­
tween capital accumulation and international division 
of labor is not sufficiently appreciated. This essay 
offers neither a new model, nor a different approach, 
nor a comprehensive survey of the literature. The 
intention here is simply to draw attention to some of
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the above issues by discussing awkward points in ex­
isting knowledge and by suggesting directions for fu­
ture research.
I. some observations on European migration
International migration is not a new phenomenon. 
The development of North and South America owes 
much to immigration from Europe and Africa, Eng­
land received immigrants from Ireland, and a consid­
erable redistribution of population took place in the 
Balkans. But the recent European experience relates 
migration to growth more starkly than ever before.
As it has been emphasized by Castles and Kosack, 
and by Power and Hardman the labor-receiving 
countries are interested in importing labor services 
rather than workers. This is sometimes referred to as 
temporariness of migration and is crucial to the dis­
tribution of benefits and costs among the countries 
involved. The receiving countries have assumed only 
a small part of the social cost of labor. Paine cites 
impressive evidence for the temporariness of migra­
tion.
For instance, between 1959 and 1968, the propor­
tion of Italian repatriation to emigration was about 
75 per cent in the average, while for Switzerland, the 
number of departures of guest workers per 100 new 
arrivals during 1960 to 1969 ranged from 52.9 per 
cent in 1961 to a high of 100.4 per cent in 1965. 
Paine also analyzes the background of the use of 
temporarily recruited labor on fixed-period employ­
ment contracts.
Other researchers, like Bullinger and Schiller, have 
emphasized the role of immigrant labor as a tool for 
economic stabilization and almost all researchers 
who have studied the subject point out the aggressive 
and highly selective recruiting which was carried out 
under official auspices of intergovernmental organi­
zations. Schiller offers a good review of the use of 
immigration as a stabilization device and Bullinger 
reports on a study of foreign labor and the business 
cycle in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is 
interesting not just because controlling immigration 
is an interesting tool for manipulating the labor sup­
ply, but also because of the importance of stabiliza­
tion in capitalist growth.
Among the few descriptive accounts of the impact 
of migration on the sending country we have, Paine’s 
quite extensive description of the case of Turkey 
stands out. Therefore, some of her arguments are 
summarized here. Skilled industrial workers were 
found to be over-represented among the migrants 
and more likely to settle abroad permanently. Seri­
ous shortages did not develop until 1972. No ev­
idence was found, except in isolated instances, about 
whether or not loss of skilled workers has raised
wages, discouraged training and encouraged utiliza­
tion of more capital intensive techniques—except in 
isolated instances. Savings and remittances out of 
earnings abroad have been mainly utilized not for 
agricultural or industrial investment but for con­
sumption expenditures. However, repatriated earn­
ings do not seem to have had much inflationary im­
pact, and the proportion spent on imports afterwards 
has probably been low. Business established by re­
turnees were few and mainly in the service sector. 
Few returnees have learned skills abroad and those 
who have not used them upon return. Little evidence 
was found that labor organization has had an adverse 
impact on the pattern of trade. Overall, emigration 
has not provided substantial capital for domestic cap­
ital formation and has tended to reduce the supply of 
trained manpower for new industrial projects. Fi­
nally, since the poorest among the population have 
not shared in the benefits from emigration income 
distribution has not improved.
II. migration, economic growth, and social welfare
The theoretical literature on the welfare aspects of 
migration is still far from satisfactory. Some impor­
tant considerations such as substitutability between 
different kinds of labor and between capital and 
labor and differential propensity to save among 
emigrants and those left behind have been taken into 
account. Yet, the framework which is usually em­
ployed by, e.g., Grubel and Scott, Berry and Soligo is 
the usual static welfare analysis. Thus, it cannot 
handle adequately such trade-offs as those between 
long-run growth fueled by migrant worker remit­
tances and the welfare of those left behind. In addi­
tion, the welfare aspects of the use of migration as a 
deliberate policy tool—as, in fact, has been suspected 
by writers in economics and politics of migration 
—may easily be determined in an optimal economic 
growth model. Specifically, under what conditions 
could a country sustain in the long-run a policy of 
being a net lender of labor; who gain, and who lose in 
such a situation; what role do differential savings 
rates and the terms of trade play; these are questions 
which might be best investigated by such a model. A 
good example is the recent pioneering study by 
Caramanis. Caramanis develops a two-sector, two- 
good, open economy optimal control model which 
incorporates migration relationships in the planning 
process for human and natural resources. The 
parameters of the model are calibrated with data per­
taining to the Indian state of Gujarat and the numeri­
cal solution for a ten-year period offers valuable in­
sights into the growth process.
For an evaluation of the effects of migration 
on labor exporting countries an essentially mac­
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roeconomic investigation (like the one proposed 
above) would need to be complemented by a mic­
roeconomic study of the structure of migration. Such 
a study would provide a concise description of migra­
tion as an individual investment decision. Second, it 
would provide clues to the relationship of migration 
to inequality and to social mobility. That is, to the 
extent that the migration decision may be viewed as a 
decision under uncertainty, as David demonstrated, 
the dispersion of earnings within each of the different 
spatially separated labor markets also enters.
It is natural to think of migration as an investment 
in the context of the human capital approach as em­
ployed by Bowles (1970) and others. Not withstanding 
the critique of human capital theory by Bowles and 
Gintis (1975) this approach would allow the analysis 
of the transfer of value which might be underlying 
this lending of labor. Such a focus would not make 
the individuals decision the central point, nor would 
it underrate the importance of the organized nature 
of migration. It is, simply one of the few empirical 
handles we have to study the welfare and growth 
aspects of labor movements.
The reliability and scope of the data published by 
European governments is poor. This has hampered 
vigorous analytic work. (Ironically, it appears as if 
migration has been treated by most European gov­
ernments as such a temporary phenomenon which 
would not necessitate collection of good data.) There 
is however enough cross-section data on income, 
education, age, training, and prior employment status 
to satisfy the requirements of the human capital ap­
proach.
ΠΙ. migration and sodal structure
Economic analysis is central to any migration 
study. Unquestionably, major spatial redistributions 
of the population have substantial impact on the so­
cial structure; these too should not be neglected.
For the postwar European case such considera­
tions at the international level are required, which 
would inevitably bring in political considerations. 
Castles and Kosack in their study, Immigrant Work­
ers and Class Structure in Western Europe, argue that:
«International labor migration is part of the global relationship 
between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. It cor­
responds with the interests of the ruling classes of both. For the 
former, migration provides an industrial reserve army which helps 
retard wage increases and keeps profits high. In addition, immigra­
tion is politically advantageous to the employers, through its effect 
in weakening the labor movement and dividing the working class. 
For the latter, it alleviates unemployment and removes discon­
tented elements who might otherwise attack the reactionary system 
which keeps the country in a state of underdevelopment.» (Castles 
and Kosack, p. 428).
Such a strong political view may be contrasted with 
liberal critiques of migration which typically evolve 
around the relative magnitudes of economic variables 
descriptive of the situation. That is, liberals would 
probably restrict themselves to questions like: How 
does labor migration actually affect the balance of 
payments when a constant flow of returnees demand 
consumption goods to satisfy newly acquired con­
sumption habits? Or, does country’s ability to pur­
chase imports distort the pattern of domestic invest­
ment in import substitution and export promotion?
Instead of assuming a perfectly functioning alli­
ance of dominant classes thriving on cooperative 
schemes—as it is, in fact, implicit in the above quo­
te—we might consider using existing evidence to 
identify the modus operandi of such schemes. E.g., to 
pose the question in an inverse fashion and to ask 
about characteristics of a «dominant» class that 
would benefit from labor outflow. Since most of the 
labor-exporting countries, such as Greece, have not 
had a feudal past proper, the specificity of their 
socioeconomic formation would make up for enough 
variability to complete such case studies.
The argument is not that received theory would 
totally fail to explain labor movements like the ones 
which were experienced in postwar Europe. We are 
arguing that such explanations may be inadequate in 
that not only they would treat the role of capital in an 
historical fashion but they would fail to capture the 
significance of the labor force restructuring that is 
taking place with migration. Furthermore, even if 
the neoclassical hypothesis is not refuted, it is quite 
plausible that migration may shift a labor-exporting 
economy into an entirely different growth path. Such 
a path may not be optimal from society’s point of 
view, although it may be preferred by a (section of 
the) capitalist class, or, imposed upon by outside in­
terests, or even be of mutual advantage to a domestic 
and foreign capitalist class. If rapid capitalist de­
velopment by indigenous capitalists is feasible, and 
provided that such a class is politically «sovereign», I 
would expect the advantage of a cheap labor pool to 
be exploited. This may not materialize, however, in 
several situations. I could name a few such pos­
sibilities: resource endowments are such they may 
favor «lending labor» as a means of capital accumula­
tion; strong domestic interests in large market for 
imports of consumption goods; or, suboptimal 
domestic saving and investment behavior. Therefore, 
it is only too natural that interplay of interests be­
tween dominant classes in both labor-sending and 
labor-receiving countries would be at the center of 
massive labor force restructuring.
This, however, does not explain the actual 
mechanism by which this restructuring is brought 
about. But, that the power of labor has been vigor­
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ously curtailed is, of course, undoubtable. For in­
stance, as it has been argued by Nicolinakos (1973; 
1975), the availability of immigrant labor has pro­
vided a convenient way to stratify the labor force and 
to maintain exploitation—since the latter is facili­
tated when workers are less familiar with the envi­
ronment. Overall, however, this is sharply modified 
by the character of existing economic relations be­
tween advanced and less developed countries. Coun­
tries like West Germany have so far pursued aggres­
sive expansionary policies—recognizing no labor sup­
ply constraints.
IV. conclusions
In sum, the theoretical and empirical investigations 
which were proposed here would facilitate our un­
derstanding of growth and structural aspects of 
migration. In addition such investigations would 
also elucidate the nature of peripheral domi­
nant classes—especially, in view of the contradictions 
which European economic integration exhibits—and 
it would also provide input to policy-making about 
regional disparities, in the context of such an integra­
tion.
The radical Marxist argument maintains that rapid 
accumulation requires, in addition to development of 
markets, labor market segmentation. If the radical 
argument is correct and to the extent that migration 
has served to segment the European working class, 
we should expect as a result a worsening of the dis­
tribution of income at both ends—the host country 
and the labor-exporting country. We would argue 
that however clear—but not necessarily correct —the 
radical argument might be in the case of the host 
country it appears that so far it has not been com­
pletely developed for the impact of migration on the 
labor-exporting country. However, the mass migra­
tion process in post-World War II Europe might be 
interpreted—exploitation of a pool of cheap labor, an 
insurance device for the domestic labor force, or a 
flexible stabilization device—it is as significant to 
European advanced capitalism as the Enclosures
were for the emergence of British capitalism. But, is 
it not, at the same time, shaping patterns for future 
growth of the lesser developed countries in Southern 
Europe and Northern Africa?
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